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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
William F. Helbling appeals from his conviction and 
sentence. A jury found that Helbling embezzled funds from 
a profit sharing plan covered by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act ("ERISA") to pay the operating 
expenses of three failing companies he owned, and engaged 
two lawyers to help him by creating false documents 
indicating that the withdrawals had been part of a lawful 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") conversion. 
Helbling's appeal raises numerous issues relating to the 
timeliness of his indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at trial, and the calculation of his sentence.1 We 
will affirm his conviction and sentence in all aspects. An 
understanding of the facts of the case is a necessary 
foundation for a discussion of the issues he raises. 
 
I. 
 
On December 18, 1996, a federal grand jury returned a 
thirty-five count indictment against Helbling. The 
indictment included: (1) one count of conspiracy to 
embezzle employee pension plan funds and falsify ERISA 
documents (18 U.S.C. S 371); (2) four counts of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction over Helbling's appeal over his conviction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 and his sentence under 18 U.S.C. S 3742. We gave 
Helbling leave to file a supplemental pro se brief and a reply brief and 
leave to the government to respond. We have considered both his 
counseled and pro se submissions. We have denied Helbling's motions to 
file further supplemental briefs and appendices. 
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embezzlement of employee pension plan funds from an 
ERISA covered plan (18 U.S.C. S 664); (3) eighteen counts of 
falsifying documents required by ERISA (18 U.S.C.S 1027); 
(4) six counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. S 1343); and (5) six 
counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. S 1341). The mail fraud 
counts were dismissed during trial.2 The jury convicted 
Helbling of twenty-seven of the remaining twenty-nine 
counts. 
 
Before trial, Helbling filed a motion to dismiss the 
indictment on the basis that the indictment was not timely. 
On July 22, 1996, Helbling had signed an agreement 
waiving his statute of limitations defense. However, Helbling 
argued to the District Court that the waiver was invalid 
because he had been coerced into signing it by fraud and 
misconduct. Helbling also argued that the government had 
failed to investigate allegations he had made about third 
parties to a degree Helbling says he believed the waiver 
agreement required. The waiver agreement specifically 
allowed Helbling "to present for investigation" his 
allegations which included claims that a number of 
individuals purposely injured his companies. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion in 
part by finding that the government had fulfilled its part of 
the bargain. The Court found that on October 15, 1996, 
government agents met with Helbling and accepted from 
him documents he believed supported his claims. Before 
ceasing their investigative activities, the agents reviewed the 
documents and spoke with another agent who had 
previously investigated related complaints. 
 
Trial commenced on May 13, 1998. At trial, the 
government offered proof that Helbling illegally withdrew 
money from the profit sharing plan covered by ERISA, used 
the funds to pay the operating costs of three companies he 
owned, and had two lawyers help him withdraw the money 
and legitimize the withdrawals by creating backdated 
documents to reflect that the plan had been lawfully 
converted into an ESOP. Helbling did not contest many of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court granted Helbling's motion to exclude the documents 
charged in the indictment. The United States filed a superseding 
indictment on May 20, 1998. 
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the background facts presented at trial including his 
control of the three companies, his administration of the 
plan, or the financial transactions themselves. Helbling 
instead argued that the government failed to establish that 
he had acted with the requisite criminal intent, and that 
the government witnesses were lying. In his pro se brief, 
Helbling explains that he acted on the advice of counsel 
who told him that he could withdraw funds from the plan 
and document the ESOP conversion later as long as he had 
secured the consent of the company's board of directors. 
 
To prove its case, the United States presented numerous 
documents and several witnesses. The witnesses included 
Helbling's alleged co-conspirators, the two lawyers, Gerald 
S. Susman and Stephen Sokolic, who testified to the false 
ESOP conversion, Laura Scurko, who testified about the 
financial transactions and explained that ERISA covered 
the plan, Barry Penn, Susan Kramer and Donald Mayle, 
who testified to the forgery of two important documents, 
and John Grikis and Barry Katz who managed the plan 
investments at NatWest Bank and Oppenheimer & Co. 
Several of the plan participants also testified. 
 
The witnesses explained that Helbling was the president, 
chief executive officer, and sole shareholder of three 
companies, Micro-Technology Co. (and its subsidiary Micro- 
Products Engineering Co.), Scranton Electronics, Inc., and 
Yardley Group, Inc., which Helbling ran as one company, 
and the administrator of Micro-Products Engineering 
Company Profit Sharing Retirement Plan. The plan was 
funded exclusively by Micro-Products. Ed Wisniewski, a 
plan participant and long-time employee, testified that the 
plan was established by a previous owner in 1965 to 
provide retirement income as an incentive to salaried 
employees to remain with the company. Laura Scurko, an 
attorney who was appointed trustee of the plan in a civil 
suit brought by the plan participants, testified as a lay 
witness and explained that the plan was covered by ERISA. 
She pointed out that the plan documents stated that the 
plan was amended and restated in 1976 to comply with the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. As of 
March 1991, the plan had assets of approximately 
$625,000 and covered ten salaried employees. The plan's 
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assets were held by NatWest Bank which also acted as 
trustee to the plan. 
 
Helbling's companies were manufacturing companies that 
relied heavily upon military contracts. In May 1990, at 
Helbling's direction, the companies filed for Chapter 11 
reorganization. In February 1992, the Bankruptcy court 
converted the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings into a 
Chapter 7 liquidation because the companies failed to 
provide the Court with the required monthly filings. The 
companies subsequently ceased business. While in 
bankruptcy, the companies continued to struggle because 
they lacked sufficient cash flow and were unable to procure 
new military contracts. 
 
In February 1991, Helbling directed John Grikis, then a 
trust officer at NatWest, to transfer the plan's assets to 
Oppenheimer & Co. Helbling's companies had been 
contacted by Barry Katz, an Oppenheimer fund manager, in 
late 1990. The funds were transferred on March 13, 1991 
after Grikis received a letter sent by Katz indicating that 
Oppenheimer would assume responsibility for the funds. 
The day after the transfer to Oppenheimer, Helbling moved 
$125,000 to an account at Farmers & Mechanics Bank and 
used it to pay operating expenses. In July, after 
conversations with Katz during which Helbling explained 
that he wanted to remove more money, Helbling converted 
the account to a margin account and borrowed $350,000 
against the plan's assets. Katz approved the conversion 
after receiving a fax supposedly signed by Barry Penn, a 
lawyer, indicating that Micro-Product's plan permitted the 
company to borrow against the plan's assets. The money 
was again used to pay operating expenses. At trial, Penn 
and his secretary, testified that the letter was a forgery. 
They explained that Helbling, who had been Penn's client, 
twice asked Penn to write the opinion letter, first in person 
and later by fax, but that Penn refused because he was not 
familiar with pension law or the profit sharing plan. 
Subsequently, Helbling instructed Katz to close the account 
and sent Katz a letter, dated August 29, 1991, which 
confirmed that the plan had been converted into an ESOP. 
Helbling subsequently withdrew money from the account in 
the form of a check for $55,300 on September 6, 1991, and 
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a wire transfer for $29,700 on September 16, 1991. 
Helbling withdrew a final amount of $3,500 on January 3, 
1992. 
 
Attorneys Gerald Susman and Stephen Sokolic were the 
government's two key witnesses. Both testified pursuant to 
plea agreements. Susman testified first. He explained that 
he first spoke with Helbling in the early part of 1990 after 
Helbling had been referred to him by Arnold Kaminer, who 
provided health insurance for Helbling's companies, to help 
Helbling establish a trust to hold his life insurance. During 
the summer of 1990, Susman completed some estate 
planning work for Helbling. Kaminer confirmed that he 
referred Helbling to Susman for estate planning, and also 
testified that he mentioned the possibility of an ESOP in a 
conversation with Helbling in February of 1991. 
 
Susman testified that Helbling called him again in March, 
and July, of 1991. During the conversation in March, 
Helbling asked Susman if he knew of any sources of 
financing because his companies were having financial 
trouble. During the conversation in July, Helbling asked 
Susman about withdrawing money from a profit sharing 
plan. Sometime around August, 20, Helbling called Susman 
again. This time, according to Susman, Helbling told him 
that he had made the large March and July withdrawals 
from the Micro-Products plan. 
 
Susman testified that he "was flabbergasted" when 
Helbling told him in August of the large withdrawals. 
Susman had thought that Helbling had been asking about 
removing money from his own personal stake in a plan 
when he answered Helbling's questions in July. Susman 
immediately told Helbling that he could not remove funds 
from the plan unless he had an ESOP and explained that 
to have an ESOP, Helbling needed a valid resolution of the 
board of directors that predated the distribution, and an 
appraisal of the stock. Susman testified further that he 
explained that since the companies were in bankruptcy, the 
stock was worthless. When Helbling asked if Susman would 
prepare the required resolution, Susman refused. When 
Helbling asked if they could still go ahead with the ESOP, 
Susman said that he would look into the matter and get 
back to him. Helbling and Susman met the next day, and 
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Helbling provided Susman with several documents 
including a copy of the plan. 
 
Susman subsequently sought advice from Stephen 
Sokolic, an attorney with more experience with ERISA, to 
find out whether they could document what had been done 
as an ESOP. Susman testified that after talking with 
Sokolic, he felt that the documentation could legitimately 
be completed. Subsequently, Susman reviewed Helbling's 
August 29, 1991 letter to Katz that said that the ESOP had 
been converted into an ESOP under Susman's direction. 
The letter also authorized the liquidation of the account. 
 
Both Susman and Sokolic testified that they reviewed the 
documents Helbling gave them and met with Helbling on 
September 11, 1991. During that meeting, Susman and 
Sokolic explained to Helbling that the withdrawals were 
prohibited transactions under ERISA. However, after the 
meeting, Susman and Sokolic prepared a retainer 
agreement which Helbling later signed. The retainer 
agreement stated explicitly that the loan Helbling took from 
the plan was prohibited by ERISA, and that there could be 
a subsequent Department of Labor investigation and 
possibly fines because the transactions might violate 
Department of Labor regulations. However, on cross- 
examination both Susman and Sokolic testified that while 
they told Helbling the withdrawals had been prohibited 
transactions under ERISA, they did not tell Helbling that 
the withdrawals or the creation of the backdated ESOP 
could be the basis for criminal prosecution. 
 
Susman and Sokolic testified that on October 14, 1991 
they met again with Helbling who was accompanied by 
Donald Mayle, an employee of Helbling's companies. In 
preparation for this meeting, Susman and Sokolic drafted 
most of the documents needed to achieve the ESOP 
conversion. At the meeting, Helbling signed the employee 
stock ownership plan and the ESOP trust agreement. Both 
documents were backdated to July 25, 1991. He also 
signed the stock purchase agreement, which purported to 
transfer 12.5% of the stock to the plan for $500,000, which 
was backdated to March 1, 1991.3 Mayle witnessed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The ESOP conversion was limited to $500,000 to avoid the need for 
filing with the SEC. 
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Helbling's signatures. A promissory note for $85,000, 
representing the additional funds withdrawn from the 
Oppenheimer account in September, was signed by 
 
Helbling in November, and backdated to September 8, 
1991. The conversion was made dependent upon a later 
appraisal of the companies validating the stock price. 
 
Both Susman and Sokolic testified that they were 
originally unwilling to backdate the ESOP plan document 
and the trust agreement, but gave in to Helbling's demand 
during the meeting. Sokolic, however, testified that he 
backdated the stock purchase agreement and the stock 
certificates to coincide with Helbling's withdrawals before 
the meeting. In response to questions from Helbling's 
bankruptcy attorneys in December of 1991, Susman and 
Sokolic drafted an opinion letter with Helbling's input that 
Susman and Sokolic testified was misleading and false. 
Ronald Santora, Helbling's bankruptcy attorney, 
subsequently presented the letter to the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
When asked why he agreed to create the documents, 
Susman testified that "he wanted the fee." On cross- 
examination, Susman testified that he did not intend to 
steal from the plan participants and did not conspire with 
Helbling to steal money. Susman testified that after he first 
met with Sokolic he thought the ESOP conversion could be 
completed legally, and that he first understood that he had 
committed a crime in November of 1991. He did, however, 
admit that earlier, in August, he had committed a crime 
because he had participated in Helbling's illegal activities 
by reviewing a draft of Helbling's August 29 letter to Katz 
which confirmed that the plan had been converted into an 
ESOP and authorized the liquidation of the Oppenheimer 
account. 
 
Sokolic corroborated much of Susman's testimony, 
particularly the meetings with Helbling, the retainer 
agreement, and the backdating of documents. Sokolic 
testified that he realized that he had committed a crime in 
"hindsight," explaining that he originally believed that he 
was serving his client to the best of his ability by 
documenting the ESOP, and that it was not until November 
and December of 1991 that he first began to reconsider the 
legality of his acts. Sokolic, however, also conceded 
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repeatedly that his actions were illegal because he created 
false or misleading documents that were required by 
ERISA. Sokolic explained his initial view by saying that he 
had understood that Helbling intended to create the ESOP 
in March of 1991, as indicated by the board of directors' 
consent dated March 8, 1991, and that he had felt he was 
simply documenting that transaction. 
 Sokolic said that he first saw the consent sometime 
between the September and October meetings with 
Helbling. At trial, Donald Mayle, who along with Helbling 
supposedly signed the consent, testified that his signature 
was forged. Susman testified that Helbling brought the 
consent to the October 14 meeting. Susman also testified 
that Helbling had asked him to create a board of directors' 
consent during the first August conversation. 
 
The government also presented witnesses who testified 
that Helbling gave them specific directions on how to refer 
to the infusions of cash in reports to the Bankruptcy Court 
and in certain letters. Donald Mayle testified that Helbling 
directed him to record the money as receipts and inventory 
in reports filed with the Bankruptcy Court. Thomas Taylor, 
former sales manager and later vice-president of sales at 
Scranton Electronics, testified that Helbling directed him to 
sign two letters intended to help Helbling's companies 
obtain a Certificate of Competence from the Small Business 
Association stating that Helbling had personally injected 
$350,000 into the companies. Obtaining a certificate would 
have made it easier for Helbling's companies to procure 
military contracts. 
 
Throughout the period, the plan participants requested 
information from Helbling about the plan. After the money 
was moved from NatWest, NatWest stopped providing the 
plan participants with monthly statements. Helblingfirst 
told the participants about the conversion in October. After 
two meetings during which plan participants protested the 
conversion, they filed a lawsuit. The record from the 
sentencing hearing reflects that Helbling had sent the 
participants letters blaming them for the companies' 
difficulties and threatening them with unemployment, 
sought to file retaliatory and harassing civil suits against 
them, falsely informed the state of New Jersey that they 
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were responsible for approximately $240,000 in back taxes 
due to the ESOP conversion, and refused to comply with 
the order entered at the end of the civil proceedings. As a 
consequence of the civil lawsuit, Lauren Scurko was 
appointed trustee. In her role as trustee, Scurko recovered 
less than $24,000 of the original amount. 
 
At the end of the government's case, Helbling offered no 
witnesses on his behalf. Helbling moved to dismiss the 
conspiracy count arguing that the government failed to 
establish that either Susman or Sokolic entered into an 
agreement with Helbling. The District Court denied the 
motion. After closing arguments were heard, Helbling 
moved for a new trial based upon alleged misconduct of the 
prosecutor for making impermissible statements in the 
opening and closing arguments, and for reconsideration of 
his statute of limitations argument. The District Court also 
denied both motions. 
 
Helbling was sentenced on January 25, 1999. The 
District Court increased Helbling's offense level under 
S 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for Helbling's role in 
the offense and under S 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice 
based on Helbling's efforts to pressure Susman, Sokolic 
and Mayle to lie during the investigation. The District Court 
also departed upwards under S 5K2.3 for extreme 
psychological damage to the victims of Helbling's 
embezzlement. 
 
Helbling now appeals the District Court's sentencing 
decisions. He also seeks a new trial based on statements 
made in the prosecutor's opening and closing statements, 
the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the District 
Court's decision on the validity of the statute of limitations 
waiver. We will address all of these issues beginning with 
the statute of limitations waiver. 
 
II. 
 
Helbling argues that the District Court erred by 
upholding the validity of his waiver of the statute of 
limitations. His primary contention is that the waiver must 
be invalidated because the government failed to fulfill its 
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part of the bargain, which required the government to allow 
Helbling "to present for investigation" charges he had 
leveled against individuals he felt sabotaged his companies.4 
He urges that the government was obligated to complete a 
full and thorough investigation of his allegations. He alleges 
that the District Court erred in rejecting this contention 
because it failed to inquire into what Helbling reasonably 
understood the waiver to mean. We will affirm the District 
Court's decision because, even if Helbling is correct to 
assert that we must compare the government's actions to 
what Helbling "reasonably understood" it had promised to 
do,5 we cannot conclude, on the basis of the language of the 
waiver or the record in front of us, that Helbling reasonably 
understood the waiver to require an investigation any 
broader than he actually received. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The relevant portion of the agreement, with the added rider, stated: 
 
       In order to allow ample time for me to confer with representatives 
of 
       the U.S. Attorney's Office,* I hereby knowingly, voluntarily and 
       expressly waive the right of defense provided by any statute of 
       limitations with regard to the above criminal statutes of the 
United 
 
       States Code based upon the failure of the U.S. Attorney's Office to 
       obtain an indictment for violations of those during the period from 
       July 22, 1996 through December 31, 1996. 
 
       * and to present for investigation by the FBI and the Department of 
       Labor those allegations which I have set forth in my letter to the 
       U.S. Attorneys Office dated July 13, 1996, specifically paragraph 
#3. 
 
5. The parties do not direct us to any controlling authority where we 
have actually considered whether the government had breached a 
statute of limitations waiver in a criminal case. Helbling argues that we 
should use the same standard here as we use to determine whether a 
plea agreement has been complied with. See, e.g., United States v. Nolan- 
Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (considering "whether the 
government's conduct is inconsistent with what was reasonably 
understood by the defendant when entering the plea of guilty."); see also 
United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 124, 124 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(noting that waivers of statutes of limitations have been viewed as being 
similar to guilty pleas). We decide neither that this standard is 
necessarily applicable to waivers, nor that defendants who sign waiver 
agreements should always receive the same protections as those who 
sign plea agreements. Rather, even assuming the standard does apply, 
Helbling cannot succeed. 
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The District Court addressed this specific contention, 
along with others, in a written opinion, after holding an 
evidentiary hearing into the circumstances surrounding the 
signing of the waiver agreement. Finding the government's 
witnesses credible, the District Court addressed each of 
Helbling's allegations as to why the waiver was fraudulently 
coerced and rejected each of them.6 Importantly for this 
discussion, the District Court found that Helbling knew and 
understood the implications of waiving the statute of 
limitations, was not unduly pressured into signing the 
waiver since he engaged in extensive negotiations regarding 
the waiver provision, and was repeatedly advised to retain, 
or request, counsel. 
 
Addressing whether the government fulfilled its bargain, 
the District Court noted that the provision itself did not 
clearly describe the extent of investigation required, and 
stated that Helbling had not introduced any evidence 
showing that a particular meaning had been agreed upon. 
The District Court proceeded on the basis that the 
agreement imposed a duty on the government to investigate 
and found that the government had done enough to satisfy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Considering Helbling's allegations that he was coerced into signing the 
waiver by threats and by misrepresentations, and that he was not 
represented during the negotiations, the District Court determined that 
the government was ready to indict Helbling when the waiver was signed 
so it did not coerce him into signing the waiver by falsely threatening 
immediate indictment, and that Helbling realized, or should have 
realized, that the waiver would provide the government more time to 
investigate, as well as provide him more time to prepare, and, therefore, 
the government did not misrepresent the effect of the waiver. 
 
In his pro se brief, Helbling alleges that the prosecutor conspired with 
Susman's lawyer to coerce Helbling to sign the waiver, and states that 
Department of Labor investigator Daphne Rich testified that Susman and 
Sokolic had agreed to cooperate with the government before Helbling 
signed his statute of limitations waiver. However, Susman's lawyer's 
testified at the hearing, and the District Court rejected Helbling's 
argument that he was coerced by him. The District Court also found that 
Susman's plea agreement came months after Helbling signed the waiver. 
The Court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous, and we agree with 
its legal conclusions. Therefore, to the extent that Helbling asserts 
these 
 
arguments as separate grounds to invalidate the waiver, we reject them. 
We find no evidence in the record to support Helbling's other allegations. 
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its obligation and, therefore, the waiver was valid. We apply 
the clearly erroneous standard of review to the District 
Court's finding of facts and review the District Court's legal 
conclusion that the government fulfilled the terms of the 
agreement under the plenary standard of review. See United 
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(reviewing a district court's determination that the 
government did not breach a plea agreement). 
 
The difficulty with Helbling's argument on appeal is that 
his assertion -- that the government promised to engage in 
a full scale investigation -- cannot be squared with the 
record evidence, or the language of the waiver itself. 
Helbling argues in effect that he reasonably understood 
that the government would complete a full scale 
investigation because he would not have agreed to the 
waiver without such a promise. However, even if we were to 
step beyond the language of the provision which only 
requires the government to allow him to "present for 
investigation" -- a promise the government clearly fulfilled 
-- we cannot find support for his assertion because at the 
pre-trial hearing a government agent testified that she told 
Helbling that the government would not agree to more than 
a promise to evaluate Helbling's evidence. 
 
Helbling signed the waiver agreement on July 22, 1996. 
According to testimony presented at the hearing, and which 
the District Court found credible, SA Donald Wadsworth 
had spoken to Helbling on July 19, and Helbling advised 
him that he wanted Wadsworth to perform an expansive 
investigation and include Helbling's allegations against 
others in his review. When Helbling, thereafter, told 
Department of Labor investigator Daphne Rich that 
Wadsworth had promised him that if he signed the waiver, 
the government would investigate his charges, Rich said 
that the government would only evaluate the evidence he 
gave to Wadsworth and Rich. Thereafter, that day, Helbling 
signed the waiver in the presence of two other FBI agents. 
Therefore, we conclude that Helbling's belief that the waiver 
required the government to fully investigate his claims was 
unreasonable. 
 
Furthermore, we note that the government did indeed do 
more than permit Helbling to "present" his allegations. 
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Reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that, 
before the government ceased its investigation into 
Helbling's allegations, government agents met with Helbling 
and discussed his allegations, reviewed the documents 
Helbling gave them, and culled out those which the 
government already had, those that were new and those 
that were related to a prior investigation. The agents also 
spoke to Robert Connolly, the Chief of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice in Philadelphia, who 
had already investigated allegations related to many of 
Helbling's complaints of sabotage in a protracted 
investigation from 1989-1992, and reviewed the documents 
with him. 
 
Accordingly, we find the waiver to have been valid. 
 
III. 
 
Next, Helbling challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting all the counts of his conviction. Helbling argues 
that the government failed: (1) to establish an agreement 
necessary for a conspiracy; (2) to establish a scheme to 
defraud required by the wire fraud convictions; or (3) to 
establish that ERISA covered the Micro-Products plan, as 
required by the embezzlement and false documents 
convictions.7 Our standard of review is highly deferential. 
"We determine whether there is substantial evidence that, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 
would allow a rational trier of fact to convict." Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note at the outset of this discussion that Helbling also alleges in 
his pro se brief that the government withheld exculpatory evidence and 
suborned false testimony in return for plea agreements. Since these 
arguments were not raised to the District Court, we review for plain 
error. To the extent that Helbling's argument rests on United States v. 
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999), we note that this Court 
has now rejected the holding of the first Singleton decision in United 
States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 1999), decided after briefing. 
Furthermore, Helbling had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses at trial, and we find no factual support for his other 
allegations. 
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1995). We find that substantial evidence did support the 
verdicts and we will affirm all the convictions on all counts. 
 
Helbling first argues that the government failed to 
establish that he conspired with either Susman or Sokolic.8 
To establish a conspiracy, the government must show: (1) 
a unity of purpose between two or more persons; (2) an 
intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to 
work together. See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 
1201 (3d Cir. 1994). Circumstantial evidence may be used 
to establish a conspiracy although if the government relies 
entirely on circumstantial evidence "the inferences drawn 
must have a logical and convincing connection to the facts 
established." Id. (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 
416, 422 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). The 
indictment charges Helbling with conspiracy (1) to defraud 
the plan and participants, or (2) to put false information in 
documents required by ERISA. We must affirm the jury 
verdict if the government adduced sufficient evidence of 
either object of the conspiracy. See id. at 1201-02 (citing 
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991)). 
 
Helbling argues that the government failed to show that 
he entered into an agreement with either Susman or 
Sokolic because both testified that they did not intend to 
commit unlawful acts and that they came to understand 
the illegality of their actions only by hindsight. However, 
their testimony was replete with statements from which the 
jury could reasonably have inferred that Sokolic and 
Susman had the necessary intent and knowledge regardless 
of their statements to the contrary. For example, both 
testified that they acted illegally, and that they agreed to 
complete work for Helbling after explaining to him that the 
withdrawals were prohibited transactions. 
 
Contesting his wire fraud convictions, Helbling argues 
that the government failed to establish that Helbling 
participated in a scheme with the specific intent to defraud. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 1343; United States v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 
544, 551-52 (3d Cir. 1995). Helbling argues that the 
government failed to prove this element of the crime 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Helbling raised this issue at trial as a Rule 29 motion to dismiss. The 
District Court denied the motion. 
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because he relied upon the expertise of Susman and 
Sokolic, and because both testified that they did not intend 
to defraud the participants. 
 
Clearly, sufficient evidence existed to establish that 
Susman and Sokolic had the requisite intent. However, 
even if Helbling's contention about Susman's and Sokolic's 
intent had merit, their intent is irrelevant to Helbling's 
conviction since a wire fraud conviction is not dependent 
upon the existence of an agreement. See United States v. 
Nelson, 54 F.3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995). Susman and 
Sokolic testified that Helbling directed them to construct 
the ESOP and backdate the documents. Testimony also 
supports the conclusion that Helbling forged Barry Penn's 
letter to Oppenheimer before engaging the services of 
Susman or Sokolic, and that he alone forged the consent of 
the directors sometime after engaging their help. These acts 
are clearly probative of Helbling's intent. 
 
Finally, Helbling contends that the government failed to 
establish that the plan was subject to ERISA. Counts 2 
through 5 of the indictment charged Helbling with 
embezzlement of plan assets in an "employee benefit plan 
subject to any provision of title 1 of [ERISA]" in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 664 and counts 6 through 23 charged Helbling 
with violating documents required by title I of ERISA to be 
published, kept as records or certified to the administrator 
of the plan. See United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 565 
(3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that a conviction underS 664 
requires a showing that the plan is covered by ERISA); see 
also United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1995) (explaining that a conviction under 18 U.S.C.S 1027 
requires a showing that (1) the defendant made a false 
statement; (2) knowing it to be false; (3) in a document 
required by ERISA). A plan is subject to ERISA if itfits 
under 29 U.S.C. S 1003(a), and is not exempted by the 29 
U.S.C. S 1003(b). Relevant definitions are provided in 29 
U.S.C. S 1002. 
 Helbling contends that the government failed to introduce 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that 
the plan was covered by ERISA, and argues that the plan 
was not covered by ERISA as a matter of law.9 Generally, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Helbling's counseled brief argues that the government failed to submit 
sufficient evidence. Helbling raised and developed his second theory in 
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whether a plan is covered by ERISA is an issue of fact to be 
decided by the jury, which we review under the substantial 
evidence standard, see Furst, 886 F.2d at 565, though we 
exercise plenary review when our review requires the 
interpretation and application of legal precepts. See United 
States v. Martorano, 767 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
At trial, the District Court precluded the testimony of two 
experts offered by the government who would have testified 
about the nature of the plan because the government failed 
to comply fully with discovery requirements.10 The 
government therefore relied upon the lay testimony of 
Laura Scurko, the court appointed plan trustee, Susman 
and Sokolic. Scurko testified that the plan was covered by 
ERISA, that the plan was restructured to be an ERISA plan, 
and that the plan itself suggested that it was covered by 
ERISA. Susman and Sokolic predicated their testimony, as 
well as their guilty pleas, on the basis that the plan was 
covered by ERISA. The government also introduced 
testimony of the plan participants indicating that the plan 
had the characteristics of an ERISA covered plan, including 
testimony that the plan was established to provide 
retirement income to workers who did not receive piece rate 
incentives, after they left the company. 
 
Reviewing the factual evidence adduced at trial and the 
legal arguments raised in response by the government, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
his subsequent pro se brief. The government points out that he did not 
raise his second argument in front of the District Court. However, we 
have explained that since the alleged error directly relates to his 
criminal 
responsibility, such error would be plain error. See United States v. 
Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering whether a 
plan was covered by ERISA for the first time on appeal). 
 
10. The government intended to have Debra Golding and Kevin Long 
testify, and presented a letter to Helbling outlining the general areas 
about which they would testify. Helbling moved to preclude their 
testimony, asserting that the government's letter failed to comply with 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(e) which requires the 
government to "describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the 
reasons for those opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications." Rejecting 
the government's contention that Golding and Long were lay witnesses 
not covered by 16(a)(1)(e), the District Court granted Helbling's motion. 
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conclude that sufficient factual evidence and legal support 
existed for the conclusion that the plan was covered by 
ERISA. The government convinces us as an initial matter, 
with reference to the facts discussed above, that the plan 
fell within the general ERISA definitions, particularly 29 
U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A). See In re New Valley Corp. v. New 
Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that a court must begin first look to see whether the plan 
fits under the general provisions of ERISA and then 
consider the exceptions). Section 1002(2)(A) extends ERISA 
to cover plans established or maintained by an employer to 
the extent that it provides retirement income regardless of 
the method use to determine contributions, or calculate 
and distribute benefits. See 29 U.S.C.S 1002(2)(A). The 
government also explains that the plan fits within the 
definition of a defined contribution plan, see 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(34), and correctly rebuts Helbling's arguments as to 
why the plan was exempt from ERISA coverage in whole or 
in part. Finally, the government points out that even if the 
plan was exempt from certain provisions of ERISA, for 
example, by having the characteristics of a "top hat" plan, 
18 U.S.C. S 1027 and 18 U.S.C. S 664 would still apply 
because they do not require that the plan in question be 
subject to all of ERISA's various provisions. Rather, these 
criminal provisions require that the plan be a plan"subject 
to any provision of title 1," 18 U.S.C. S 664, or that the 
fraudulent statement be contained in a document required 
by title 1. See 18 U.S.C. S 1027. 
 
IV. 
 
Helbling next argues that the prosecutor, Assistant 
United States Attorney Jayne K. Blumberg, made 
prejudicial comments in her opening and closing 
statements that require the grant of a new trial. Helbling 
argues that her opening statement included impermissible 
characterizations and impermissible vouching, and that in 
her closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor again 
acted impermissibly by characterizing Helbling and his 
actions, implying that Helbling committed improprieties in 
the past, and by describing the evidence that the letter 
supposedly signed by Barry Penn was forged as 
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 "uncontroverted." Without parsing the prosecutor's 
comments, which we have paraphrased in the margin, 11 we 
note that, although the government disputes many of 
Helbling's contentions of misconduct, the United States 
acknowledged in its brief that the prosecutor's opening 
statement "overstepped the parameters of an opening 
statement" in the manner in which it characterized 
Helbling. See Appellee's Br. at 38. We quite agree that Ms. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Early in opening arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that the 
defendant had "[u]gly values: Dishonesty, disloyalty, deceit, and above 
all, greed. To be sure, ladies and gentlemen, the Defendant, William 
Helbling is a thief. He lied to these men, he stole their retirement 
moneys 
 
boldly and brazenly." The prosecutor also called Helbling a looter while 
pointing a finger in his face, and said, while discussing the companies' 
financial problems, that "the one source [of money] was what he called 
his `secret fund,' his slush find, his private kitty. And he stole the 
money, he stole the retirement money." The prosecutor also called 
Susman and Sokolic "unscrupulous," and explained that they assisted 
Helbling in "covering up his fraud, his looting of moneys." After a 
defense 
 
counsel objection, the prosecutor completed her opening by stating that: 
"We believe that you will find the Defendant guilty as charged." The 
District Court directed the jury to disregard the comment. During the 
prosecutor's opening, the Court sustained a number of defense counsel 
objections and brought counsel to side bar where the judge admonished 
the prosecutor. At the close of the prosecutor's opening, the judge 
reminded the jury, as he had already explained during his preliminary 
instructions, that the opening statement was not to be considered as 
evidence. 
 
Before closing arguments began, the District Court again reminded the 
jurors, as part of the jury instructions, that they must not consider the 
opening and closing arguments as evidence. In the early portion of her 
closing argument, the prosecutor referred to "a greedy person's plan," the 
"Defendant's plunder and thievery," and the Defendant's "track record of 
lying, cheating and deceit." The prosecutor also called evidence that the 
letter from Barry Penn to Oppenheimer was forged"uncontroverted." In 
rebuttal, the prosecutor again referred to the same evidence as 
"uncontroverted," and further characterized the defendant as "arrogant" 
and "despicable" which the court instructed the jury to disregard. Upon 
defense counsel objection to the second reference to uncontroverted 
evidence, the District Court told the prosecutor to avoid such references. 
Later at side bar, the Court asked defense counsel what counsel wanted 
the court to do to neutralize the statement. Counsel asked the Court to 
"leave it, please." 
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 Blumberg's remarks were over the line, and arguably even 
out of line. The government will not be sanctioned in this 
instance, however, because our case law punishes the 
government by granting a new trial in such a situation only 
if the defendant was prejudiced by the remarks in question. 
Here, we conclude that a new trial is not warranted 
because Helbling was not in fact prejudiced. We reach this 
conclusion even though we view AUSA Blumberg's remarks 
to have been inappropriate, and we urge that the United 
States Attorney for New Jersey remind his assistants of the 
limits of appropriate advocacy. 
 
"Prosecutorial conduct does not always warrant the 
granting of a mistrial." United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). "An appellate court 
should not exercise its `supervisory power to reverse a 
conviction . . . when the error to which it is addressed is 
harmless since, by definition, the conviction would have 
been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error.' " Id. 
(quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 
(1983)). The harmless error standard requires us to 
consider the record as a whole. The standard of review 
depends upon whether the error was constitutional or non- 
constitutional. If the error is non-constitutional, we will 
affirm "when it is highly probable that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment." Id. (quoting Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)). If 
the error is constitutional, we will affirm if wefind that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United 
States v. Molina-Guervara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
 
Even under the most stringent harmless error analysis, 
we cannot conclude that Helbling was prejudiced."In 
determining prejudice, we consider the scope of the 
objectionable comments and their relationship to the entire 
proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative 
instructions given, and the strength of the evidence 
supporting the defendant's conviction." Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
at 1265. First, the evidence presented by the United States 
was overwhelming. See id. at 1267 (finding the evidence at 
trial substantial). As discussed above, the government 
adduced substantial direct evidence of Helbling's activities, 
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and substantial circumstantial evidence of his motivation 
and intent. Second, the District Court did give curative 
instructions. It repeatedly instructed the jury not to 
consider counsel's arguments as evidence, doing so before 
the prosecutor's opening, after the prosecutor's opening, 
and before her closing argument, and appeared to do so in 
a way that conveyed the Court's displeasure with counsel's 
tactics. See id. at 1267 (finding characterizations 
neutralized in part by instructions not to consider the 
opening evidence); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 
738 (3d Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the Court told the jury to 
disregard the vouching in the prosecutor's opening 
statement and to disregard the references to "arrogant" and 
"despicable" in rebuttal. Lastly, we note that defense 
counsel asked the Court not to give a curative instruction 
to neutralize reference to "uncontroverted" testimony in a 
side bar conference. 
 
Helbling seeks to distinguish this case by arguing that he 
was prejudiced because the government's comments 
poisoned the jury's mind regarding his intent, a crucial 
element in each count of his indictment. Helbling places 
considerable reliance on United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 
F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 1998), in which we found the defendant 
to be prejudiced by the comments of a prosecutor in closing 
and rebuttal arguments which inflated a limited stipulation 
that the defendant "had the chemical background to know 
the ingredients and equipment necessary to make 
methamphetamine" into one stating that the defendant 
knew how to make methamphetamine. See Mastrangelo, 
172 F.3d at 295. We find Mastrangelo to be easily 
distinguishable from our case. First, and most importantly, 
in Mastrangelo, the prosecutor misstated a stipulation to 
make it encompass a fact central to the government's 
charges and not otherwise supported by any evidence the 
government presented. See id. at 298. Here, the government 
introduced overwhelming circumstantial evidence of 
Helbling's intent. Second, in Mastrangelo, we explained that 
the district court's curative instruction may have served to 
exacerbate the problem because the court reaffirmed the 
prosecutor's incorrect view of the stipulation. See id. at 
296. Here, we view the curative instructions as having 
neutralized the possible prejudice. 
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We note that Helbling's argument is also weakened by 
United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1994), where 
we found that a prosecutor's reference in opening argument 
to the defendant's "crooked law practice" was not 
misconduct requiring a new trial since the comment was 
clearly related to the charges the government had to prove 
and was supported by the evidence presented at trial. See 
Retos, 25 F.3d at 1226. But see Somers, 496 F.2d at 737- 
38 ("Whether or not proofs were ultimately adduced 
warranting such characterizations is irrelevant. Such 
characterizations add nothing to the legitimate education of 
the jury which is not afforded by the proper presentation of 
the facts to be proved."). Here, although the prosecutor's 
comments may have been a pointed assertion of Helbling's 
guilt, the characterizations were related to the charges 
contained in the indictment which the evidence presented 
later did in fact establish. Accordingly, we find prejudice to 
be lacking. 
 
V. 
 
Helbling also appeals the District Court's determination 
of his sentence. Helbling contends that the District Court 
erred by increasing his offense level four-levels under 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a), "Aggravating Role," by increasing his 
offense level two-levels for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1, and by departing upwards two-levels for 
psychological harm. See U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3. 
 
A. S 3B1.1(a), Aggravating Role 
 
Helbling argues that the District Court erred in applying 
a four-level enhancement to his offense level pursuant to 
S 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines for"Aggravating 
Role." Section 3B1.1(a) states in full: "If the defendant was 
an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved 
five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, 
increase by 4 levels." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a). Helbling finds 
fault with the District Court's view regarding both aspects 
of this Guideline, namely that he was an organizer or 
leader, and that the activity was "otherwise extensive." Both 
Helbling and the government agree that Helbling's criminal 
activity did not involve five "participants" as defined by the 
commentary to the Guideline. 
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We review a District Court's factual determinations 
underlying the application of the sentencing guidelines for 
clear error. See United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 
(3d Cir. 1989). Although we give due deference to the 
District Court's application of the sentencing guidelines to 
those facts, as required by 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e), we exercise 
plenary review over legal questions involving the proper 
interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines. 
See United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d Cir. 
1992). We will address the two aspects of the relevant 
Guideline section in turn. 
 
       1. Leader or Organizer 
 
Section 3B1.1(a) applies only if a sentencing courtfinds 
that "the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal 
activity." Application Note 4 explains that a court should 
consider a number of factors when determining if the 
defendant was an organizer or leader, rather than a 
manager or supervisor. 
 
       In distinguishing a leadership and organizational role 
       from one of mere management or supervision, titles 
       such as "kingpin" or "boss" are not controlling. Factors 
       the court should consider include the exercise of 
       decision making authority, the nature of participation 
       in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of 
       accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the 
       fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in 
       planning or organizing the offense, the nature and 
       scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control 
       and authority exercised over others. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, Application Note 3; United States v. Ortiz, 
878 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1989). We have explained that 
to be considered an organizer or leader, "the defendant 
must have exercised some degree of control over others 
involved in the commission of the offense." United States v. 
Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 
The District Court made specific factual findings, which 
are not clearly erroneous, in determining that Helbling 
acted as an organizer or leader. The Court found that: 
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       Helbling recruited all of the participants mentioned 
       above and his attorneys, Sokolic and Susman, to help 
       him in his criminal activity. He alone made the 
       decision to conceive and implement his conversion 
       scheme. The benefits from his scheme went either to 
       his personal use or into shoring up companies which 
       he was the sole owner. Helbling played the key role in 
       structuring the operation to defraud the retirement 
       plan and convert its assets. There is no evidence that 
       anyone else exercised control over the criminal scheme, 
       nor exercised any decision-making authority. 
 
On appeal, Helbling raises two arguments. Helbling 
argues first that the evidence failed to show that Helbling 
recruited Susman and Sokolic with a criminal purpose or 
controlled their activities. Helbling also argues, citing 
United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1992), that 
he cannot be a leader or organizer because the other 
participants -- Susman and Sokolic -- were equally 
responsible for the criminal activity. 
 
Given the guideline provision and the record evidence, we 
find the District Court's factual findings to be proper and 
its legal conclusion that Helbling was an organizer and 
leader unassailable. In so doing, we necessarily reject 
Helbling's arguments which are essentially fact based. 
Contrary to his urging, the District Court could properly 
find that he had a criminal purpose in recruiting Susman, 
that he controlled their activities in orchestrating the 
scheme through them thereafter, and that he was more 
culpable than they were.12 On these facts, Katora does not 
dictate a different result.13 Finally, we note that evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Helbling's reliance on the terms of Susman's and Sokolic's plea 
agreements as proof of their equal culpability is misplaced. The 
Guideline clearly contemplates that a defendant may be the leader or 
organizer of another criminally responsible individual; the amount of loss 
stipulated to in a plea agreement is surely not the only factor that bears 
on the relationship between those individuals. 
 
13. Katora is simply not applicable to this case. In Katora, we explained 
that a defendant cannot be assessed an offense level enhancement under 
S 3B1.1 where the district court determined that the two participants 
were equally culpable and did not organize, lead, manage or supervise a 
third participant. See Katora, 981 F.2d at 1405. In this case, however, 
the District Court determined that Helbling alone organized and led the 
criminal activity which involved two other participants. 
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that certain individuals provided expertise or planning does 
not necessarily counter evidence that their actions were 
controlled by another. 
 
       2. "Otherwise Extensive" 
 
The second part of S 3B1.1(a)'s analysis requires the 
sentencing court to determine whether the "criminal activity 
. . . involved five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a). Since the government 
acknowledges that Helbling, Susman and Sokolic are the 
only "participants," this case requires us to determine when 
a criminal activity is "otherwise extensive." See United 
States v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 1339, 1346 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the leader or organizer may be included when 
determining the number of participants); see also U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1, Application Note 1 (defining "participant"). This 
seemingly simple phrase, which also appears in S 3B1.1(b), 
has spawned much discussion, and some disagreement, in 
the opinions of several courts of appeals. The courts that 
have considered the question agree that the "otherwise 
extensive" language makes S 3B1.1(a) applicable when 
criminal activity involves the equivalent of five participants, 
but disagree as to whether, if fewer than five participants 
are involved, the determination of equivalence must focus 
upon a headcount of the individuals involved, or may also 
rely upon other indices of extensiveness such as the 
magnitude of the harm, the complexity of the planning, or 
the number of victims. Compare United States v. 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1997) (focusing 
analysis on the number of individuals involved), with United 
States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53-54 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(permitting consideration of a broad range of indices). 
 
In Carrozzella, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit explained that the analysis of "otherwise extensive" 
must focus initially upon the number of participants, and 
the knowing or unknowing persons, involved in the 
criminal activity, and then a subsequent determination 
must be made as to whether the roles and involvement of 
all those persons constitute the functional equivalent of five 
"participants" as defined by the Application Notes. See 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 802-04. This contrasts with the 
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rulings of several other courts of appeals that permit a 
broader inquiry that examines other characteristics of the 
criminal activity as well. See United States v. Brockman, 
183 F.3d 891, 900 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 120 S.Ct. 
800 (2000) (permitting consideration of the number of 
persons involved and the amount of loss); United States v. 
Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 1997) (following 
Dietz); United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir. 
1994) (permitting courts to "to examine factors in addition 
to a headcount to justify a finding that a given criminal 
activity is extensive"). For example, the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, in United States v. Dietz,  explained that 
"the extensiveness of a criminal activity is not necessarily a 
function of the precise number of persons, criminally 
culpable, or otherwise, engaged in the activity" and upheld 
a four-level increase based upon a general conception of 
extensiveness which included a finding that the activity 
spanned twelve years, crossed seven states and victimized 
a number of governmental agencies without an exact 
determination of the number of individuals involved. See 
Dietz, 950 F.2d at 53-54. In United States v. Rose, 20 F.3d 
367, 374 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit explained that "[w]hether criminal activity is 
`otherwise extensive' depends on such factors as (i) the 
number of knowing participants and unwitting outsiders; 
(ii) the number of victims; and (iii) the amount of money 
fraudulently obtained or laundered." Id. at 374 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
In United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998), 
the only opinion in which we have previously considered 
the "otherwise extensive" prong of S 3B1.1(a), we affirmed 
the application of S 3B1.1(a) to enhance the offense level of 
a defendant convicted of running a large and complex 
"Ponzi" scheme which the district court found involved two 
participants and at least thirteen non-participants who 
assisted Bennett. See id. at 194. Many of these individuals 
served Bennett by withholding information from investors 
and legitimizing his activities by preparing reports based 
upon false information he had provided. See id.  Because 
the evidence of extensiveness was so clear, due to the 
involvement of at least thirteen others, we did not discuss 
whether other indices of "extensiveness" could be 
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appropriately considered under S 3B1.1.14 We take the 
opportunity to decide this issue here. 
 
We will subscribe to the analysis of the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit as described in Carrozzella. We 
believe that the focus upon the number and roles of the 
individuals knowingly, and unknowingly, involved best 
comports with the text of S 3B1.1, its application notes and 
commentary, as well as the overall structure of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. We note that while the Guideline 
itself provides no clear guidance as to the meaning of 
"otherwise extensive," the application notes and the 
commentary strongly indicate that the focus should be 
upon the number of persons involved. Although we disagree 
with the District Court's decision to count one"non- 
participant," we agree with the District Court, which 
essentially applied the Carrozzella test, that the 
combination of Helbling, Susman and Sokolic -- the 
participants -- together with the countable non- 
participants, made Helbling's criminal activity"otherwise 
extensive" for the purposes of S 3B1.1. 
 
Application Note 3 specifically includes an example of 
"otherwise extensive" that is instructive."In assessing 
whether an organization is `otherwise extensive,' all persons 
involved during the course of the entire offense are to be 
considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three 
participants but used the unknowing services of many 
outsiders could be considered extensive." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, 
Application Note 3 (emphasis added). The background 
commentary is consistent with a numerical focus: 
 
       This section provides a range of adjustments to 
       increase the offense level based upon the size  of the 
       criminal organization (i.e., the number of participants in 
       the offense) and the degree to which the defendant was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Since we did not engage in a broader analysis, we place no 
significance upon citations in Bennett to United States v. D'Andrea, 107 
F.3d 949, 957 (1st Cir. 1997), and United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d at 53, 
decisions that permit the district court to consider the "width, breadth, 
scope, complexity, and duration of the scheme." See Bennett, 161 F.3d 
at 194 n.14. These citations were placed in a footnote attached to the 
last part of the analysis and are no more than dicta. 
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       responsible for committing the offense . . . . The 
       Commission's intent is that this adjustment should 
       increase with both the size of the organization and the 
       degree of the defendant's responsibility. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, Background (emphasis added). 
 
The background commentary also explains why the size 
of the criminal activity is important to the purpose of the 
provision. It notes that the Sentencing Commission drafted 
the Guideline's separate provisions to respond to criminal 
organizations whose size and structure increases the 
significance of the defendant's role. Compare  U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1(a)-(b), with S 3B1.1(c)."In relatively small criminal 
enterprises that are not otherwise to be considered as 
extensive in scope or in planning or preparation, the 
distinction between organization and leadership, and that 
of management or supervision, is of less significance than 
in larger enterprises that tend to have clearly delineated 
divisions of responsibility." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, Background 
(emphasis added). 
 
If the Commission intended the courts to utilize a 
broader analysis to determine if a criminal activity was 
"extensive" it could easily have said so. Instead, the notes 
clearly indicate the Commission meant the courts to 
consider the role of the defendant and the size of the 
criminal organization as its way of determining the relative 
responsibility of the defendant, so as to mete a greater 
sentence to those who likely received a greater division of 
the illegal profit, posed a greater danger to the public, and 
are more likely to commit more crimes in the future. See 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, Background ("This adjustment is 
included primarily because of concerns about relative 
responsibility. However, it is also likely that persons who 
exercise a supervisory or managerial role in the commission 
of an offense tend to profit more from it and present a 
greater danger to the public and/or are more likely to 
recidivate."). 
 
Furthermore, limiting our construction of "extensiveness" 
to a head counting analysis reduces the potential for double 
counting certain aspects of criminal activity that are 
considered elsewhere in the scheme of the guidelines, thus 
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helping to maintain the distinct character of various 
guideline sections. See Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 802-03. For 
example, as the court in Carrozzella explained, in a fraud 
conviction the base offense level can be increased based on 
the amount of loss, the extent of planning, and the number 
of victims. See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1; Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 
802. Further adjustments may be made to account for the 
vulnerability of the victims, see U.S.S.G.S 3A1.1, the 
defendant's role, see U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2, and abuse of a 
position of trust.15 See U.S.S.G. S 3A1.3. If we were to adopt 
a broad reading of the phrase "otherwise extensive," so that 
some of these possible adjustments could be considered in 
that inquiry as well, a defendant would possibly receive two 
sentence enhancements for the same attributes of the 
crime. We avoid this result by focusing upon the number of 
individuals involved. 
 
We disagree with the government that our opinion in 
United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 668 (3d. Cir. 1993), 
undercuts this rationale. In Wong, we held that where the 
guidelines happen to direct the sentencing court to increase 
the defendant's sentence under two separate sections-- 
which respond to different evils -- based on different 
aspects of the same conduct, the district court does not err 
by "double counting" those aspects in determining the 
sentence. See Wong, 3 F.3d at 668; see also United States 
v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 211-13 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
a double counting argument in accordance with Wong); 
United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 
1996) (same). Thus in Wong, we found no error in the 
district court's decision to increase the defendant's offense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Similarly, following a broad reading of "otherwise extensive" would 
permit a court to consider the amount of drugs sold in both the base 
offense level and as an element leading to the determination that the 
activity was extensive. See United States v. Rodriquez, 981 F.2d 1199, 
1200, 1200 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (finding no problem with 
considering drug quantities as evidence of extensiveness). 
 
Not surprisingly, courts following a broad test for extensiveness 
repeatedly encounter, though they have rejected them, arguments 
complaining of double counting relating to the finding of extensiveness in 
fraud cases. See, e.g., Brockman , 183 F.3d at 900 n.8 (rejecting 
argument based upon double counting by way of S 2F1.1 and S 3B1.1.). 
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level for both more than minimal planning, see  U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1(b)(5), and aggravating role under U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1(c) -- the degree of planning and defendant's role 
were different attributes of the same conduct. See Wong, 3 
F.3d at 668, 669 n.4. Here, the guideline focuses on the 
attribute or aspect of the numerosity of the group that the 
defendant led or organized. The language of two or more 
sections may well require consideration of different 
attributes of the same conduct. This is not an untoward 
result, but, rather an intended one.16 
 
Having adopted the test that requires us to focus upon 
the number and participation of the individuals involved in 
the criminal activity, we must address how the district 
courts are to apply it to the situations facing them. 
Although Application Note 3 supports our mode of analysis, 
the guidelines are silent as to how the sentencing court 
actually is to decide which non-participants should be 
considered, and what combination of participants and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Application Note 4, of S 1B1.1, was amended effective November 1, 
1993, to state that "[a]bsent an instruction to the contrary, the 
adjustments from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively 
(added together). For example, the adjustments fromS 2F1.1(b)(2) (more 
than minimal planning) and S 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) are applied 
cumulatively." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1, Application Note 4 (amended November 
1, 1993, Amendment 497). We believe that this amendment, which 
followed a few months after our decision in Wong , reinforces the decision 
in Wong and our reasoning here. We read the Application Note to explain 
that a defendant cannot attack a sentence by arguing that the district 
court impermissibly considered evidence of more than minimal planning 
when both adjusting under S 2F1.1(b)(2) and when engaged in finding 
the defendant to be a leader, organizer, manager or supervisor as 
specifically directed by S 3B1.1, Application Note 4. Indeed, prior to the 
amendment, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Romano, 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992), found that because it viewed 
consideration of more than minimal planning as being required by 
S 3B1.1's application notes an enhancement under both provisions was 
not permitted. See Romano, 970 F.2d at 167. In United States v. 
Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242 (6th Cir. 1996), the court recognized that Romano 
had been effectively overruled by the amendment. See Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 
at 251. Nothing about the amendment leads us to believe that it meant 
to implicate the breadth of analysis required or permitted under the 
second part of S 3B1.1(a) -- the determination of the size of the criminal 
activity. 
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countable non-participants is the "equivalent" of five 
participants. We agree with the court in Carrozzella that 
not every individual tangentially involved in the criminal 
activity can fairly be considered in the analysis. See 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 803. The purpose of the provision 
would rarely be achieved by counting the unknowing 
services of some actors in a criminal scenario, a taxicab 
driver or bank teller, for instance. 
 
The court in Carrozzella developed a three step inquiry to 
help determine which individuals should be counted. 17 See 
id. at 803-04. This test distinguishes non-participants who 
should be considered from those who should not be 
considered on the basis of the defendant's intent in 
involving them in the criminal activity and the nature of 
their role in the offense.18 Under this test, a sentencing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The Second Circuit wrote in full: 
 
       [W]e believe that the following must be determined by the 
sentencing 
 
       court: 
 
       (i) the number of knowing participants; 
 
       (ii) the number of unknowing participants whose ac tivities were 
       organized or led by the defendant with specific criminal intent; 
 
       (iii) the extent to which the services of the unkn owing 
participants 
       were peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme. 
 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 803-04. 
 
18. We note that the Introductory Commentary to Part B, which contains 
S 3B1.1, was amended effective November 1, 1990 to state that: "The 
determination of a defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the 
basis of all conduct within the scope of S 1B1.3(a)(1-4), and not solely 
on 
 
the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction." Prior to 
the amendment, we held that S 1B1.3 did not apply to the analysis 
under 3B1.1. See United States v. Murillo, 933 F.2d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 89-90(3d Cir. 1992). 
In these cases, we focused upon the language of the provision -- the 
offense -- to conclude that consideration of who could be considered a 
participant must be limited to those involved in the offense charged and 
all conduct in furtherance of the offence of conviction. See Murillo, 933 
F.2d at 199. In both cases, we noted that our decisions did not address 
the effect of the amendment on our analysis. See id. at 198 n.1; see also 
Pollen, 978 F.2d at 89 n.24. We do not decide today whether the scope 
of S 1B1.3 might affect our analysis. 
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court must first separate out the "participants" as defined 
by Application Note 1 from other individuals, non- 
participants, who were involved in the criminal activity. "A 
`participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for 
the commission of the offense, but need not have been 
convicted." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1, Application Note 1. The 
defendant may be considered as one of the participants. 
See Colletti, 984 F.2d at 1346. The court must next 
determine whether the defendant used each non- 
participants' services with specific criminal intent. See 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 804. Third, the court must 
determine the extent to which the services of each 
individual, non-participant, were peculiar and necessary to 
the criminal scheme. See id. at 804. Utilizing this test, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld the 
consideration of individuals used by the defendant to 
legitimize, facilitate or hide the criminal activity. See United 
States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 15 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying 
Carrozzella and upholding the finding that the criminal 
activity was otherwise extensive on the basis of casino 
personnel who unwittingly helped the defendant launder 
money); United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 273 (2d Cir. 
1998) (approving the consideration of accountants, bank 
officers, and lawyers used to perpetuate embezzlement from 
an ERISA covered pension plan including the filing of 
incomplete documents). We view this test as helpful in 
defining which non-participants should be counted, and 
subscribe to it. 
 
After deciding which individuals may be counted, the 
court must then consider whether the sum of the 
participants and countable non-participants is the 
"functional equivalent" of five participants. We note that, at 
a minimum, a criminal scheme must involve more than one 
participant in order to be found otherwise extensive; there 
can be no less than the defendant and one participant the 
defendant led or organized. See U.S.S.G.S 3B1.1, 
Application Note 2 ("To qualify for an adjustment under this 
section, the defendant must have been the organizer, 
leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other 
participants."). However, a court's determination as to the 
functional equivalence does not lend itself to a mere 
numerical analysis, but will necessarily be guided by the 
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sentencing court's discretion. In deciding whether the total 
is the equivalent to five participants, the sentencing court 
may consider other factors, including the nature of the 
criminal scheme, to evaluate the relative value of the 
various countable non-participants. 
 
We will apply the test we have crafted to the case at 
hand. We note that Helbling urged us to adopt the Second 
Circuit's test and does not contest the District Court's 
determination that Helbling, Susman and Sokolic should be 
counted as participants. Therefore, the analysis rests upon 
the validity of the court's decision to count six non- 
participants -- John Grikis, Arnold Kaminer, Bruce Katz, 
Donald Mayle, Ronald Santora and Thomas Taylor -- and 
the conclusion that the combination of these three 
participants and these six non-participant individuals is the 
equivalent of five participants. Helbling disputes the 
consideration of each individual. He argues that Katz and 
Grikis should not be considered because both merely 
transferred funds at Helbling's instruction. Helbling argues 
that Mayle, Santora and Taylor should not be considered 
because they all acted as part of a bankruptcy fraud which 
was not peculiar and necessary to the criminal activities 
that supported Helbling's conviction, and, finally, Helbling 
argues that Kaminer should not be considered because the 
letter Kaminer wrote at Helbling's behest, falsely saying 
that they had a conversation about an ESOP conversion, 
was never sent. We agree with the District Court's 
conclusion in all but Kaminer's case, and find that the 
District Court properly concluded that the combination of 
participants and countable non-participants makes 
Helbling's scheme "otherwise extensive." 
 
In arguing that Katz and Grikis should not be considered, 
Helbling unduly narrows the scope of our inquiry. While 
our test, which considers both the intent with which the 
defendant directed the individual's involvement and the 
extent to which the services of the individual were peculiar 
and necessary to the criminal scheme, instructs the 
sentencing court to disregard individuals who are 
essentially functionaries, the activities of Katz and Grikis 
are distinguishable from those of other banking employees 
who, for example, might have simply moved the money for 
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Helbling. See generally Napoli, 179 F.3d at 15 (applying 
Carrozzella and upholding the finding that the criminal 
activity was otherwise extensive on the basis of casino 
personnel who unwittingly helped the defendant launder 
money). Helbling used the services of Grikis and Katz to 
convert an account held by NatWest as a trustee owing 
fiduciary duties, into an account that from which he could 
withdraw funds, borrow against and which he could 
eventually liquidate. 
 
We also believe that the District Court was correct to 
count the activities of Mayle, Santora and Thomas. Each 
individual helped Helbling hide his criminal activities. See 
Bennett, 161 F.3d at 194 (counting non-participants who 
helped hide and legitimize the criminal activity). At the 
direction of Helbling, Mayle attested to Helbling's signatures 
on the ESOP conversion documents and hid the influx of 
$350,000 from the Bankruptcy Court. Similarly, Thomas, 
at Helbling's direction, submitted false documents to the 
Small Business Association describing the $350,000 as a 
personal cash infusion from Helbling. Lastly, at Helbling's 
direction, Santora, Helbling's bankruptcy lawyer, submitted 
false documents given to him by Helbling to the bankruptcy 
court. 
 
We reject Helbling's argument that Mayle, Santora, and 
Thomas ought not be considered because their activities 
were related to crimes for which Helbling was not indicted, 
and, therefore, their activities were not peculiar and 
necessary to Helbling's criminal behavior.19 These activities 
aided Helbling's embezzlement activities by concealing 
Helbling's withdrawals from the Bankruptcy Court, from 
the Small Business Administration, and from the plan 
participants. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In the proceedings in front of the District Court and again on appeal, 
Helbling considers Mayle, Santora and Thomas together because they 
provided services relating to bankruptcy fraud. See Appellant's Br. at 46. 
Our review of the trial testimony indicates that thefilings signed by 
Taylor were not part of the bankruptcy case. Instead, they were 
submitted to the United States Small Business Administration. However, 
we consider the three individuals together because Helbling's arguments 
why each person should not be considered are identical. 
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We agree, however, that the District Court erred in 
counting Kaminer. The District Court found that Helbling 
directed Kaminer to write a letter in December 1991 stating 
falsely that he had a conversation with Helbling about an 
ESOP conversion in February 1991. While we disagree with 
the Court's factual conclusion, that is not the focal point of 
our inquiry.20 As far as can be determined from the record, 
Helbling never used the letter, or even placed it in a 
situation where it might be used, and, therefore, we cannot 
say that Kaminer's conduct, innocuous in itself, was 
peculiar and necessary to Helbling's criminal activities. 
 
We will therefore affirm the District Court's decision to 
enhance Helbling's sentence under S 3B1.1 on the basis 
that he was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity 
that was otherwise extensive. Helbling's criminal activity 
involved three criminally responsible participants and five 
other non-participant individuals whose involvement 
Helbling directed and whose actions were peculiar and 
necessary to the furtherance of Helbling's efforts. Given the 
nature of Helbling's criminal conduct, the combination of 
these participants and non-participants was properly held 
by the District Court to be the functional equivalent of five 
participants. 
 
B. Obstruction of Justice 
 
Helbling contends that the District Court did notfind 
that Helbling had the requisite willful intent to obstruct 
justice as is required in order to increase Helbling's offense 
level under S 3C1.1 of the Guidelines.21 See U.S.S.G. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The District Court found that the letter was false because the 
conversation never took place. We find this finding clearly erroneous 
because Kaminer testified at trial that the February 1991 conversation 
did occur and that the letter merely confirmed that fact. As we find that 
Kaminer should not be counted because the letter was never used in 
furtherance of Helbling's activities, we need not determine whether 
submitting a truthful letter in an effort to support a false conclusion is 
the type of involvement that should be counted underS 3B1.1. 
 
21. Section 3C1.1 of the guidelines states: 
 
       If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted 
to 
       obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course 
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S 3C1.1; United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("[T]he government bears the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
willfully obstructed or impeded, or willfully attempted to 
instruct or impede, the administration of justice."). We 
disagree. 
 
The District Court applied the two-level enhancement on 
the basis of two acts by Helbling which it found were "clear- 
cut attempts to influence" testimony and which it 
concluded were covered under Application Note 4. 
Application Note 4 lists as one type of applicable behavior, 
"(a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully 
influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or 
indirectly, or attempting to do so." U.S.S.G.S 3C1.1, 
Application Note 4(a). The first act relied upon by the 
District Court was a letter written by Helbling to his two 
attorneys, Susman and Sokolic, in May of 1994. In the 
letter Helbling threatened to file malpractice actions against 
the lawyers and file complaints with the bar association if 
they refused to stand behind the documents they created. 
Helbling, however, contends that the letter evidences his 
frustration rather than an attempt to intimidate. The 
second act was a conversation between Helbling and 
Donald Mayle in July of 1996 during which Helbling 
pressured Mayle to say his signature on the board of 
directors' consent was genuine.22 Helbling argues that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense 
       of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the 
       defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) 
       closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. 
 
22. Two conversations between Helbling and Mayle are reproduced in the 
record. The first conversation took place on July 19, 1996. The second 
conversation took place on July 20, 1996. The District Court's opinion 
does not make it clear whether it is relying upon both conversations or 
just one. The opinion quotes from the July 19, 1996 conversation. 
 
Helbling suggests that part of the District Court's error was failing to 
consider both conversations. We believe, however, that both 
conversations indicate the same desire to influence Mayle. The issue is 
therefore moot. 
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discussion of Mayle's signature was innocuous and that the 
District Court failed to put it in context. We disagree on 
both scores. We review the District Court's factualfindings 
under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. 
Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States 
v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 
While we recognize that the Helbling's letter varies in tone 
and could be subject to differing interpretations, the letter 
demanded that the lawyers stand behind documents found 
by the jury to be false, and threatened adverse 
consequences if they did not do so. With respect to the 
conversations with Mayle, the inference drawn from the 
conversations is that Helbling desired Mayle to say that he 
signed the board of directors' consent and was urging 
Mayle to lie. We conclude that the District Court'sfinding 
that these acts represented attempts to influence testimony 
was not clearly erroneous. 
 
C. Extreme Psychological Injury to the Victims 
 
Helbling also contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it departed upward two-levels from the 
applicable guideline level on the basis of extreme 
psychological damage to the victims because there was 
insufficient evidence of psychological harm to justify the 
departure. See U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3 (Extreme Psychological 
Injury to the Victims) (Policy Statement); Unites States v. 
Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Section 5K2.3 permits a sentencing court to sentence above 
the guideline sentence level "[i]f a victim or victims suffered 
psychological injury much more serious than that normally 
resulting from commission of the offense . . ." The section 
continues to explain that: 
 
       Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently 
       severe to warrant application of this adjustment only 
       when there is a substantial impairment of the 
       intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral 
       functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely 
       to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when 
       the impairment manifests itself by physical or 
       psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior 
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       patterns. The court should consider the extent to 
       which such harm was likely, given the nature of the 
       defendant's conduct. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3. In Astorri, we upheld a departure for 
extreme psychological harm when the District Court found, 
both through testimony and its own observation, that the 
victims' health suffered after they lost their life savings. See 
Astorri, 923 F.2d at 1059. 
 
We review a district court's decision to depart from the 
guidelines under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir. 
1997)). We have noted that "[i]f there is any place in 
sentencing guidelines analysis where a fact-finder is to be 
given considerable deference, it is here where the district 
court is to be called upon to assess the psychological 
impact upon victims." See Astorri, 923 F.2d at 1058. 
However, in Jacobs, a case addressing the psychological 
effects of an aggravated assault, we explained that a finding 
that the victim's psychological injury was "much more 
serious than that normally resulting from the commission 
of the crime . . . is a prerequisite for a departure under 
S 5K2.3." Jacobs, 167 F.3d at 799. 
 
Relying principally on Astorri, a fraud case, the District 
Court found that a two level departure was warranted 
under S 5K2.3 because of the effects of Helbling's criminal 
activities and harassment. Helbling argues that the District 
Court's factual findings were insufficient for the departure. 
The District Court found: 
 
       [T]he age of Helbling's victims did not facilitate the 
       commission of his crimes, it did heighten their impact 
       . . . . The Government has convincingly detailed the 
       emotional and psychological costs of surviving 
       Helbling's crimes and resisting his harassment. These 
       costs include the humiliation of being forced to seek 
       work at an advanced age and rely on help from family 
       members, the trauma that comes from family 
       members, the trauma that comes with losing one's 
       savings, and the psychological damage resulting from 
       resisting slurs, threats, frivolous lawsuits, and 
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       pressure from the tax authorities. The evidence fully 
       justifies this two level upward departure. 
 
We believe that the District Court's findings are clearly 
supported by the record and that the record itself supports 
the determination that Helbling caused psychological injury 
"much more serious" than would normally result from his 
type of fraudulent activity. In fact, as the District Court 
recognized, the record, in the form of the Presentence 
Report and the testimony of some of the victims at trial, 
contains the same type of evidence of individual loss and 
resulting medical complications we found sufficient in 
Astorri. Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in departing upward under S 5K2.3. 
 
VI. 
 
For the reasons above, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
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